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Traditional models have encountered problems in explaining the ac-
cumulation of international reserves, particularly in Asia, in the period
since the late 1990s. One suggestion has been that countries have sought
to self insure against future crises, either because of a perceived increase
in the cost of crises or because of the perceived conditionality costs of
using IMF credits. This paper oers an empirical investigation of these
ideas, disaggregating across regions and across IMF facilities. Using
both static and dynamic regression techniques we nd that IMF pro-
grams have had a signicant positive eect on subsequent reserve accu-
mulation, allowing for other determinants, and that this eect endures
over time. We also nd that the eect diers between Latin America
and Asia, and that it is not simply a phenomenon that is associated
with the Asian crisis of 1997/98. The paper goes on to discuss the
implications for the design of policy and for the reform of the IMF.
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21 Introduction
Part of the rationale for establishing the IMF was to pool international reserves
and use them more eciently at the global level. The logic ran as follows;
reserves are an inventory held to minimize the impact of negative balance of
payments shocks. The benet of having reserves is that countries are able to
avoid unnecessary economic adjustment in the event of temporary and self-
reversing shocks or to select a preferred speed of adjustment where it becomes
necessary. However, holding international reserves involves an opportunity
cost since they carry only a relatively modest rate of return. Furthermore,
since the global balance of payments is a zero sum game, not all countries will
simultaneously experience current account decits; indeed decits in one part
of the world must, in principle, be matched by surpluses elsewhere. It follows
that not all countries will need to use their reserves at the same time. There
will therefore be a welfare gain from pooling reserves.
The IMF was designed to act as a credit union with members making only
temporary use of its resources. Countries' access to the IMF's unconditional
reserve tranche counted as part of their owned reserves. Beyond this, access
to credit tranche resources constituted an additional line of credit. These re-
sources were not unconditional and depended on negotiating a program of
policies with the IMF, but, in principle, they nevertheless represented an, al-
beit imperfect, substitute for owned reserves. The idea therefore was that the
pool of IMF resources, and the option of borrowing them, would allow member
countries to economize on their own independent holdings of reserves.
In the aftermath of the East Asian crisis in 1997/98, and following a period
of rapid depletion, the IMF encouraged the aected countries to reconstitute
their reserves. At the end of the 1990s there was a sharp accumulation of
international reserves in Asian economies and elsewhere. Figure 1 shows this
increase but also shows that there has been a more sustained increase in reserve
holdings since 1980.
Conventional models of the demand for international reserves left a large
part of the accumulation at the end of the 1990s unexplained (Aizenman and
Marion, 2003, and IMF, 2003) and much of the recent literature has focused on
trying to account for it (for example, Jeanne, 2007, and Obstfeld et al, 2008,
2009). It certainly did not seem that countries were merely bringing reserve
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Figure 1: Reserves excl. gold (% GDP)
quate. The accumulation was going beyond this point. Similarly, reserves have
been in excess of the levels suggested as being adequate by conventional ratios
expressing reserves in relation to imports, and newer ones expressing them
in relation to short-term external debt (Bird and Rajan, 2003). Optimizing
and welfare models based on the costs and benets of reserves also fall some
way short of explaining the accumulation of reserves in Asia, either in terms
of a desire to prevent crises or to mitigate their economically harmful eects
(Jeanne, 2007). Obstfeld et al. (2008, 2009) claim greater success by returning
to the long standing idea that it is concern about not only an external drain
but also an internal drain that leads countries to accumulate reserves. The
key issue here relates to nancial openness; not only a sudden stop in capital
inows but also capital ight encourages countries to build up reserves as a
way of mitigating the risks of currency depreciation.
Dierent explanations have dierent implications. One based on increased
precautionary demand would imply an increase in risk aversity amongst Asian
economies associated with an increase in the probability of future crises and
/or an increase in the perceived cost of crises in both economic and political
terms. It would also imply that reserve accumulation would cease once the
new targeted level of reserves was acquired.
2Another approach, which views the accumulation of reserves as a by-product
of mercantilist trade policies, combined with a reluctance to allow underval-
ued exchange rates to appreciate results in surpluses on the current account
of the balance of payments and intervention in foreign exchange markets to
neutralize the eect on the value of the exchange rate. Under this approach,
the constraint on persistent reserve accumulation relates to the extent to which
the eects of intervention on the domestic money supply can be sterilized.
From within the literature, and in particular the strand relating to the
increase in the precautionary demand for reserves, it has been suggested that
it was the experience with the involvement of the IMF that enhanced the
perceived cost of the crises. According to this view, Asian economies wanted
to avoid circumstances in which they would need to draw on the IMF for
nancial support in the future. An example of this line of argument may be
found in Stiglitz (2006) where he claims that East Asian countries `boosted
their reserves in part because they want to make sure that they won't need to
borrow from the IMF again.' (p. 248).
If this is the case, fundamental questions are raised about the role of the
IMF, since it would seem to be at odds with the basic notion of reserve pooling.
Although empirical studies have attempted to examine the extent to which
reserve accumulation is associated with the desire to mitigate the incidence of
crises and reduce their costs (Jeanne, 2007), as far as we are aware only Bird
and Mandilaras (2008) have made an attempt to examine the direct eect of
IMF involvement, and even there the focus of the paper is to investigate the
contemporary relevance of Mrs Machlups Wardrobe Theory of international
reserves.1 This current paper represents an extension of this earlier work. Our
purpose is to examine whether having a program with the IMF exerts a statis-
tically signicant impact on future reserve behaviour and whether this eect
is positive or negative. A positive and signicant eect would be consistent
with the claim concerning the impact of the Fund's part in the Asian crisis.
However, it is also feasible, in principle, that the eect might be negative as
countries reassess downwards the perceived cost of having a program with the
IMF in the light of experience. If this is the case, while some reserve recon-
stitution may follow an IMF program, countries would reduce their desired
stock of owned reserves relative to other key determinants following actual
1In essence, this `theory' postulates that a country can never have enough reserves.
3involvement in an IMF program.
We set out in this paper to examine empirically the eect of IMF programs
on subsequent reserve behaviour. We do this by estimating a fairly conven-
tional model of international reserves that incorporates the variables normally
seen as inuencing them. But we also incorporate dummy variables to capture
the eects of crises and IMF programs. We then disaggregate our data in var-
ious ways to see whether the eect of the IMF diers between Latin America
and Asia, between stand by arrangements, extended loans and concessionary
loans, and over dierent time periods. We cover the period since 1980, but
also test to see whether the Asian crisis had a discernible impact on reserve
accumulation. We exclude from our sample advanced economies that have not
used IMF resources since the mid 1970s.
The paper is organized in the following way. In section 2 we discuss the
factors that inuence a country's demand for international liquidity and its
choice between holding and using owned reserves or drawing conditional re-
sources from the IMF when a balance of payments need arises. This provides
an informal analytical framework. Section 3 explains the data and methodol-
ogy used. Section 4 reports our results. Section 5 discusses some of the policy
implications of our ndings. Finally, Section 6 oers a few concluding remarks.
2 Analytical Framework
For as long as countries can attract international capital they may be able to
sustain a decit in the current account of their balance of payments. How-
ever, in the event of a crisis that erodes the condence of international capital
markets, the situation can rapidly change and the balance of payments be-
comes unsustainable. Governments then have to react in some way. Their
reaction can, in principle, involve dierent degrees of adjustment intensity.
They may opt to move quickly to try and reduce the current account decit
and re-invigorate capital inows. This approach is likely to involve exchange
rate depreciation and tighter scal and monetary policy. Rapid adjustment
will probably focus on compressing aggregate demand, especially where the
output gap is small. In these circumstances, increasing aggregate supply is
unlikely to be a short run option and adjustment will then carry a signicant
cost in terms of reduced contemporary consumption, lower economic growth
4and rising unemployment.
For these reasons, governments may prefer to moderate the short run inten-
sity of adjustment and put greater emphasis on nancing the overall balance
of payments decit. In principle, they can do this in three ways. First, they
can engage in sovereign borrowing. But, in practice, and the midst of a capital
account crisis, this option may be unavailable. After all, it is probably the
weakening capital account that has contributed to causing the crisis in the
rst place.
The second option is that of running down international reserves. The
decumulation of reserves will, in eect, nance net imports and/or capital
outows. Third, and nally, countries may borrow from the IMF. They will
be able to raise loans from the Fund even at times of impaired access to
international capital markets. In reality, therefore, governments often have to
choose between the last two options. However, the choice will only be available
to them if they have suciently large holdings of reserves at the time the crisis
hits. Without reserve holdings, there is likely to be no alternative other than
to borrow from the Fund.
Countries may decide to accumulate reserves in order to retain the option
of running them down when confronted with a crisis. Reserves have an option
value. They provide a form of insurance against an uncertain future. Set
against this benet, building them up involves an economic cost. In essence
this is because, during the process of accumulation, domestic consumption will
be less than domestic output. The mirror image of reserve accumulation will be
a surplus on the current account of balance of payments. Once accumulated,
there will be an opportunity cost associated with holding reserves, since they
generate a relatively low rate of return. There is no equivalent opportunity cost
associated with retaining the option of drawing resources from the IMF. In the
case of the credit tranches, these are not resources that can be unconditionally
spent, and in order to have access to them countries have to demonstrate a
balance of payments need.
A slightly dierent approach presents countries as exhibiting a demand for
international liquidity. They can meet this by borrowing from private capital
markets, or by holding owned reserves, or by borrowing from the IMF. The
rst of these options involves a large measure of uncertainty especially in the
midst of a crisis, and as a consequence countries may discount it as a way
5of dealing with crises. Running down reserves or using IMF credit are in
a broad sense alternative ways of nancing an overall balance of payments
decit or protecting the value of the currency. But countries are unlikely to
be indierent between them. Access to credit from the IMF is certainly not a
perfect substitute for owned reserves.
This informal discussion suggests that there are a number of inuences on a
country's decision as to whether to accumulate owned reserves or rely on IMF
resources when the need arises. Owned reserves and IMF lines of credit may be
distinguished from one another in terms of various underlying characteristics,
and it will be a government's preferences between these characteristics that
determine how they respond to the possibility of future crises.
The principal attractions of owned reserves are to be found in their high
degree of liquidity and their zero conditionality. Negotiating a program with
the IMF may, on the other hand, take many months and will involve condi-
tionality in the form of prior actions that the country has to undertake before
a loan is approved, macroeconomic performance criteria that have to be met in
order for subsequent instalments of the loan to be made available, and struc-
tural benchmarks that will be used to assess the progress of the program. The
1980s and 1990s exhibited an increase in the range and degree of condition-
ality. On top of this, evidence suggests that international creditworthiness
and access to international capital markets is positively related to a country's
holdings of international reserves, and that higher reserves reduce a country's
vulnerability to economic crisis. Borrowing from the IMF may, by comparison,
damage a country's international reputation for sound economic management
and may have a negative eect on its access to other forms of international
capital. (All these claims are evaluated with reference to the existing literature
in Bird, 2007, so we do not examine them further here).
It may be anticipated therefore that governments will opt for accumulating
reserves where they perceive a high probability of future economic crises, assess
the costs of crises in terms of lost output as being high, and perceive the costs
of IMF conditionality as being high, either because they believe that the Fund
will eectively impose on them policies that they would much prefer to avoid or
because they put a high value on retaining national sovereignty over the design
of economic policy. On the other hand, in circumstances where governments
see little chance of a crisis, believe that the cost of crises is modest and also
6attach little cost to IMF conditionality, it is more likely that they will decide to
avoid the opportunity cost of accumulating and holding reserves and instead
opt to borrow from the IMF if and when it becomes necessary.
A country's actual experience with the IMF may also inuence its views.
Whatever the government's preconceived opinions, did conditionality actually
turn out to be seen as excessive and invasive? Did the government feel that
it was forced to cede the power over policy design to the IMF? In principle,
the eects of IMF programs on subsequent reserve behaviour could work in a
number of ways. In the aftermath of a crisis some restoration of reserves is
probable. Once this has been achieved, governments that found the eects of
IMF conditionality to be benecial might be expected to economize on owned
reserves. However, those nding IMF programs to carry a high cost, in either
economic or political terms, might be expected to accumulate reserves to a
degree that appears to be excessive in relation to conventional criteria.
In what follows we estimate a regression model that includes not only the
conventional determinants of the demand for reserves, but also a proxy for
economic crises. In addition we include an interactive dummy variable to
capture the eect of IMF programs. While taking into account the eect of
other variables on reserve holding, we set out to see whether IMF programs
have a lasting eect on subsequent reserve behaviour. Is it the case that
close proximity with the Fund in the form of a program encourages countries
to pursue policies with respect to international reserves that are designed to
make it less likely that future nancial support from the IMF will be needed?
Do countries that have had IMF programs opt to try and substitute out of
future ones and into owned reserves?
3 Data and Methodology
Our data cover the period 1980 to 2005 and are of annual frequency. Most
variables are from the World Development Indicators of the World Bank. Ex-
ceptions are the dierent types of IMF programs, which are directly taken
from the IMF website; the exchange rate regime data, which are taken from
the updated versions of Reinhart and Rogo (2004); and the nancial openness
variable which comes from the updated version of Chinn and Ito (2002).
The focus of our empirical analysis is on the regions of Latin America & the
7Caribbean (henceforth LAC) and South Asia & the Pacic (henceforth SAP).
There are two main reasons behind our choice of sample: rst, there have been
several crisis incidents in both regions and this facilitates our eort to disen-
tangle the eect of these crises from the eects of IMF programs on reserve
accumulation; and second, several countries in both regions have implemented
(or at least agreed to implement) a sucient number of IMF programs. Addi-
tional reasons include the availability of data and the growing importance of
particular emerging economies within the LAC and SAP regions for the world
economy.
As mentioned above, we disaggregate the IMF data by type of program.
We are interested in checking whether stand-by arrangements (SBAs) and Ex-
tended Fund Facility programs (EFFs) have a dierential eect on reserve
accumulation. Our a priori expectation is that EFFs should exert a greater
inuence on reserve holdings given the higher degree of structural condition-
ality that they entail. We also examine the impact of programs under the
Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) anticipating that this may be
rather less, since the opportunity cost of accumulating and holding reserves
may be particularly high for low income countries.
A challenge is how to capture the eects of an IMF program on reserve
accumulation. One way is to create a dummy variable that assumes the value of
one for a number of periods following an agreement, e.g. Bird and Mandilaras
(2008). The appeal of this approach is its simplicity and intuitiveness. The
number of periods for which the dummy takes the value of one can be varied
depending on the assumption made about the duration of an `IMF eect'.
However, it has the disadvantage that, if a long-term eect is conjectured,
information from subsequent programs will be lost. In practice, a series of
ones follows the rst program until the end of the sample. The implication is
that the dummy will be the same for two countries that have had their rst
program agreed on the same year but have a dierent number of programs
agreed subsequently. This may be an unreasonable assumption. To address it,
we have interacted the IMF dummy with the number of IMF programs. In the
regression analysis we have assumed three dierent horizons for the potential
IMF eect: four years, eight years and a `permanent' eect.2
2Space considerations prevent us from reporting the eight-year regression results. We
have focused, instead, on reporting the `short-term' eect (four years) and the `permanent'
eect of IMF programs.
8The controls we use in our analysis are in line with the literature: popula-
tion, GDP per capita, the interest rate (we use the deposit rate to maximize
the number of available observations), imports of goods and services as a frac-
tion of GDP, the level of short-term debt (as a proportion of GNI) and the
current account {as a fraction of GDP. In addition, the analysis controls for
the eects of crises, the exchange rate regime, the degree of nancial openness,
as well as the level of M2 to GDP. We briey discuss these four factors in turn.
There are a number of ways to capture crises but the choice is constrained
by the research question. For example, in spite of the fact that foreign exchange
market pressure indices (e.g. Eichengreen et al., 1996) are more informative
than simple exchange rate indices, they cannot be used safely when the de-
pendent variable features international reserves, as this could raise issues of
endogeneity. In this paper, we primarily use a crisis variable based on real
GDP contractions and dene a crisis as a year-on-year drop of 5%. We place
ones after a crisis has taken place and interact this variable with the number
of crises in the sample (per individual country). To check our results further
we have also constructed a crisis variable based on exchange rates: a crisis is
deemed to have taken place if the rate of exchange rate depreciation exceeds
the average rate of depreciation plus 1.5 times the standard deviation.3 Again,
a series of ones follows the rst crisis in the sample (for each country) and the
variable is interacted with the number of exchange rate crises.
The exchange rate regime under which a country operates should have im-
plications for reserve accumulation. In theory, countries with xed exchange
rates should accumulate reserves in order to maintain the peg whenever this is
threatened (e.g. by sizeable current account decits and/or capital outows).
They would also accumulate reserves if they have a positive ocial settlement
balance. Countries with exible exchange rates should not worry about re-
serves, since they leave the value of the exchange rate to be freely determined
in the foreign exchange market. In reality, few countries in our sample are free
oaters even if they claim to be such. We use the Reinhart and Rogo (2004)
`coarse' de facto classication index to determine a country's actual exchange
rate regime. We convert the index into a dummy variable that registers a zero
if the country has some sort of x including crawling pegs and bands (narrower
3Setting the formula to generate a crisis whenever the depreciation exceeds the average
plus two times the standard deviation {as would be statistically more reasonable to do{ does
not capture important crisis incidents, e.g. the southeast Asian crisis of 1997/98.
9than 2%) and ones if the exchange rate regime involves freely falling, free
oating, managed oating or a de facto crawling band narrower than 5%.
Our measure of nancial openness (KAOPEN) comes from Chinn and Ito
(2002). It is based on the IMFs Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements
and Exchange Restrictions and basically captures the degree of capital account
openness. This is a potentially signicant determinant of reserve holding given
the increased risks that nancially more open economies face.4 Another aspect
of this is the nancial depth of an economy. Larger liquid liabilities (that
can potentially be converted to foreign currency) should increase demand for
reserves; see Obstfeld et al. (2008, 2009). We use the level of M2 as a fraction
of GDP to proxy the degree of nancial maturity.
We use a least squares dummy variable (LSDV) regression to estimate a
model of the form
yit =  + X
0
it + i + it:
The LSDV estimation allows for country xed eects and the errors are robust
to cross-country correlation. In addition, to control for `persistence' in reserve
holding, we introduce the lagged dependent variable in the right-hand-side of
the equation. Taking rst dierences eliminates the country specic eect and
allows the use of GMM estimation of the resulting equation:
Yit = Yit 1 + X
0
it + it:
In the next section, we discuss the ndings from our static and dynamic panel
estimations.
4 Regression Results
Since the early 1980s the IMF has been active in extending credits to member
countries. The dierent types of programs come with varying degrees of con-
ditionality. Table 1 shows that 90 SBAs and 14 EFFs have been agreed with
LAC countries during the sample period. Argentina, Ecuador and Uruguay
have been the most frequent recipients of IMF assistance in Latin America.
The total number of programs (inclusive of programs in low income countries)
is 120. Table 2 shows that the numbers of SBAs and EFFs for SAP countries
4E.g. currency mismatches, bank runs, ight of capital.
10are 22 and 4, respectively. The Philippines has been the most frequent recipi-
ent of assistance in this region but the IMF has generally been more active in
the LAC region than in the SAP one. There were 24 PRGFs in our sample
{15 in LAC and 9 in SAP.
The higher degree of IMF involvement in Latin America can be partly
explained by the higher incidence of crises: 64 in LAC compared to 40 in
SAP. The denition of a crisis is not a straightforward exercise. It might be
reasonable to assume that IMF involvement implies a crisis and to use data
on IMF programs as crisis indicators. However, this would prevent us from
focusing on the direct eect of IMF intervention controlling for crises. Our
GDP measure is superior to an exchange rate measure in that it captures well-
documented crisis incidents, such as the Mexican crises in 1984 and 1986 and
the Asian crisis in 1997. It is also {to some extent{ uncorrelated to the IMF
variables: not all crises are accompanied by the IMF's involvement.
In our attempt to capture the eect of IMF programs on subsequent reserve
behaviour we estimate our static panel equation for all countries in the sample,
as well as for two separate subsamples: the LAC region and the SAP region.
Results are presented in Tables 3, 4 and 5. For the entire sample, GDP per
capita, imports (%GDP), the current account (%GDP), nancial depth (M2
% GDP) and nancial openness (KAOPEN) all have statistically signicant
coecients with the expected sign. Also the IMF's involvement is a signicant
determinant of reserve behaviour: SBAs, EFFs and PRGFs all have a positive
eect on reserve holding.
On the other hand, economic crises do not appear to trigger higher re-
serve accumulation levels. The exchange rate regime, somewhat surprisingly,
appears to be insignicant. However, this result is not necessarily counter-
intuitive. The average current account decit in exible regime observations
( 2:58%) is substantially lower than in less exible regimes ( 6:44%), and this
could lead to a negative correlation of the exchange rate dummy with reserves
(something that happens in the SAP sample). Population, the interest rate
and the level of short-term debt are not statistically signicant.
These results hold in the main for the LAC region with the notable excep-
tion of the nancial depth variable. The latter is signicant at the 10% level in
two of the regressions (using the permanent measures for SBAs and the total
number of IMF programs) but its performance is not convincing. Naturally we
11would expect it to be highly signicant in the SAP countries, which is indeed
the case. Turning to the other results for the SAP region, imports and occa-
sionally the interest rate they are variables that possess signicant explanatory
power. The rest of the variables, including the IMF programs, do not enter the
equation with signicant coecients. These sharp dierences between Latin
America and Asia highlight the importance of assuming a regional focus and
an acceptable level of disaggregation in large sample studies.
In some of our estimations, not reported here, we tested to see whether
reserve behaviour is aected by a governments degree of nationalism and
whether right wing or left wing orientation makes a dierence.5 No clear
picture emerged, although it seemed that in Latin America nationalistic gov-
ernments tend to hold lower reserves given other factors while the opposite is
the case in Asia.
Moving on to the dynamic specication, the results do not change much
{see Table 6. For the entire sample, imports, the current account balance, IMF
involvement and nancial depth, along with the lagged dependent variable, are
the main determinants of demand for reserves. A dierence with the LSDV
estimation results of the static model lies in the loss of signicance of the
nancial openness variable and the emergence of the interest rate as a variable
with signicant eects, albeit quantitatively small.6
Figure 1 in section 1 has provided visual evidence that since the late 1980s
reserves as a percentage of GDP have been growing, on average, in both the
LAC and SAP regions. Did the 1997 Asian crisis accelerate reserve accumula-
tion? The graph provides an insight into the answer, as the trend in the years
1998-2005 appears to be steeper than in previous years. The inclusion of a
dummy that takes the value 1 post-1997 and zero between 1980{1997 in our
static and dynamic models provides further evidence. The results reported in
Table 7 are commensurate with a signicant increase of reserve levels follow-
ing the Asian crisis. This implies that while crises in general, according to our
measures of them, have exerted an insignicant eect on reserve behaviour,
the Asian crisis was rather dierent.
5We used data from the updated Database of Political Institutions, see Beck et al. (2000).
6Estimations for Latin America & the Caribbean produced similar results. We could
not estimate the dynamic model in South Asia & the Pacic due to the limited number of
observations.
125 Discussion
Although possessing nuances when disaggregated across regions, the empirical
results reported in the previous section suggest that overall there is a signicant
positive eect of IMF programs on subsequent reserve accumulation. This
eect persists over time which suggests that it is not just a matter of countries
following IMF advice to build up their reserves in the aftermath of a crisis that
involved an IMF program. Crises on their own and in the absence of the IMF
do not seem to have a similar eect, except in the case of the Asian crisis in
1997/98. The IMF eect is present across SBAs, EFFs and PRGFs, suggesting
a broadly similar response irrespective of the nature of the program.
The decision by countries to meet the demand for international liquidity
by building up owned reserves may be costly both for the individual countries
and for the world economy as a whole. For individual economies, wealth will
be tied up in relatively unproductive assets, and the use of sovereign wealth
funds seems unlikely to immediately alter this. For the world economy, the ac-
cumulation of reserves will tend to go alongside current account surpluses and
these may form an important part of an overall problem of global economic
imbalances that can then contribute to international nancial instability and
nancial crises. It is generally more ecient, beyond a certain point, for coun-
tries to be able to access nancial assistance as and when needed than to hold
reserves to cover the risk that access to liquidity may (but may not) be re-
quired in the future. Indeed, the accumulation of reserves to cover such risk
may make future crises more likely if the policies pursued in order to achieve
this create large and unsustainable global economic imbalances.
Policy design requires us to examine the motivations that lie behind a
preference for owned reserves as opposed to access to IMF credit lines. The
key appeal of owned reserves, as noted earlier, is that they do not involve
conditionality and they possess a high degree of liquidity. The implication
therefore seems to be that in order to increase the relative attractiveness of
borrowing from the IMF, programs need to involve less conditionality than in
the past, or at least less of the type of conditionality that may be at odds
with the policy preferences of the relevant governments, and to allow resources
to be disbursed more quickly. Moreover, there is a potential Catch 22 policy
dilemma to resolve. If countries demonstrate a strong preference to avoid it,
borrowing from the IMF will send out a negative signal. It may be taken as
13a sign of economic desperation. If more countries are motivated to borrow
from the Fund rather than accumulate excessive owned reserves, any stigma
associated with having an IMF program may be removed or at least reduced.
This may then encourage others to alter their preferences in favour of IMF
credits.
Recent reforms within the IMF seem to be moving in the direction implied
by the above observations. The streamlining of conditionality upon which the
Fund embarked at the beginning of the 2000s was an attempt to narrow its
focus and increase the degree of country ownership. The major overhaul of
conditionality in the aftermath of the 2008/09 nancial crisis was designed to
take this process even further under the auspices of the new quick-disbursing
Flexible Credit Line. Under this reform, structural performance criteria that
had often been a source of tension between governments and the IMF were
discontinued, (Bird, 2009, provides a more detailed discussion of recent changes
in IMF conditionality).
Such changes may entice countries to substitute out of owned reserves and
into IMF credits. If so, then other important policy issues associated with the
global macroeconomic eects of running down owned reserves will be encoun-
tered. There would be implications for global economic imbalances. There
might also be important consequences for the values of individual currencies
as countries seek to reduce their holdings of them. It might be in this con-
text that the move towards an international monetary system based on Special
Drawing Rights rather that the US dollar could be engineered.
Even in the absence of such systemic change, the SDR could take on an
expanded role. Where individual countries demonstrated some reluctance to
sacrice owned reserves in favour of access to conditional IMF credit, their
demand for owned reserves could be met by additional allocations of SDRs.
These would possess many of the qualities of other owned reserves in terms
of liquidity and the absence of conditionality, but would not carry the costs
associated with accumulating owned reserves by other means. An important
issue would remain as to whether the SDR possesses the qualities of a good
international reserve asset as compared to some national currencies. But, in
a global economic environment where the demand for owned reserves remains
strong, additional allocations of SDRs could be globally welfare enhancing.
Although interesting and important, these policy issues probably move us
14too far away from the main theme of this paper, and certainly too far away from
the issues on which our empirical investigation makes a direct contribution.
6 Conclusions
A feature of the period since 1997/98 that has received considerable attention
in the literature has been the accumulation of international reserves in many
countries and regions, particularly in some parts of Asia. The focus has been
on whether this accumulation has led to countries holding excessive levels of
reserves in terms of the factors conventionally seen as inuencing the demand
for them. If so, conventional models are missing something. Perhaps countries
have been seeking to self insure against future economic crises. But if this is
the explanation, a related issue is why they have chosen to do this when, in the
event of a crisis, they could instead turn to the IMF for nancial assistance.
After all, part of the justication for establishing the Fund was to derive the
benets from pooling international reserves. Potentially it could be that, while
acknowledging the opportunity costs of holding large and excessive levels of
owned reserves, countries have been attaching a higher cost to the use of
IMF resources, largely because of the conditionality that is embodied in IMF
programs, their lack of liquidity and the perceived loss of national sovereignty
over the design of economic policy.
Our investigation builds on existing theoretical and empirical analysis and
sets out to test for the existence of an IMF eect on the subsequent accumu-
lation of international reserves. We nd broad support for the claim that the
experience of having an IMF program is associated with countries accumulating
subsequent reserve levels that are above those that conventional determinants
would imply, and that this IMF eect persists over relatively long time periods.
However, it may be noted that if the strategy is to avoid future recourse to the
Fund, it does not always work. As the literature on IMF lending shows there
are signicant elements of recidivism in the incidence of IMF programs (Bird
et al, 2004). Moreover, while the IMF eect is signicant in Latin America, it
is not in Asia. To the extent that IMF programs have the eect of inducing
countries to accumulate excessive reserves, there is an inconsistency with one
of the basic purposes of the Fund to pool international reserves. Indeed, the
Fund may be having a perverse eect.
15Our results, unlike some others reported in the literature, suggest that eco-
nomic crises have not generally been a signicant factor in explaining the ac-
cumulation of reserves, although the Asian crisis of 1997/98 was an exception.
The results provide further evidence that vulnerability to both an external
drain and an internal drain may be signicant in explaining reserve behaviour,
but also provide a more complete explanation than is available elsewhere.
Since there are signicant welfare costs associated with holding excessive
owned reserves both for the individual countries concerned in terms of the high
opportunity cost, and for the world economy in terms of the related global
economic imbalances, we also examine the policy changes that might reverse
the trend towards a revealed preference for owned reserves as opposed to IMF
credits by modifying IMF conditionality and by enhancing the speed of access
to IMF resources. We further relate these changes to contemporary reforms to
the IMF and the design of the international monetary system. In particular,
we briey discuss the new Flexible Credit Lines and the role of Special Drawing
Rights. A potential cause for concern is that our results suggest that countries
have a powerful and long lasting memory of their involvement with the IMF,
and reforms need to be suciently signicant to address this.
A nal observation relates to the concept of tiers of international liquidity
discussed elsewhere by us (Bird and Mandilaras, 2005). This paper has exam-
ined two of these tiers in terms of owned reserves and IMF credits. However,
regional funds may constitute a middle tier potentially possessing less condi-
tionality and a higher speed of access than IMF credits but more conditionality
and a slower speed of access than owned reserves. Broader debate about in-
ternational monetary reform may also need to address the respective roles of
these means of meeting the nancing needs of individual countries and groups
of countries and the role of a regional as opposed to a multilateral approach
to the provision of international liquidity.
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Argentina 8 2 0 10 6 7005 6
Belize 1 0 3 1 0 2659 9
Bolivia 2 0 0 5 2 951 7
Brazil 5 1 0 6 3 3255 5
Chile 2 1 0 3 2 3759 17
Colombia 2 1 0 3 1 1879 11
Costa Rica 6 0 0 6 2 3462 10
Cuba 0 0 0 0 NA NA NA
Dominica 2 0 1 4 0 3057 10
Dominican Republic 5 1 0 6 1 1862 4
Ecuador 9 0 0 9 2 1339 6
El Salvador 6 0 0 6 3 1839 8
Grenada 0 0 0 0 1 3212 14
Guatemala 5 0 0 5 2 1575 6
Guyana 1 0 4 5 2 806 25
Haiti 4 0 1 5 5 568 3
Honduras 1 0 3 4 0 916 10
Jamaica 6 1 0 7 1 2946 9
Mexico 3 2 0 5 3 5298 5
Nicaragua 1 0 3 4 2 822 8
Panama 5 1 0 6 2 3513 6
Paraguay 1 0 0 1 2 1468 13
Peru 4 3 0 7 4 2023 11
St. Kitts and Nevis 0 0 0 0 0 5617 13
St. Lucia 0 0 0 0 3 3582 11
St. Vincent and the Grenadines 0 0 0 0 0 2443 13
Suriname 0 0 0 0 5 2151 8
Uruguay 10 0 0 0 3 5396 8
Venezuela, RB 1 1 0 2 7 4992 13
All 90 14 15 120 64 2796 10
Table notes: SBA is a stand-by arrangement; EFF is an extended funding facility;
PRGF is a poverty reduction and growth facility. \Total" is the sum of SBAs, EFFs
and PRGFs. Crises are real GDP contractions by 5 or more percent. GDP is in
current USDs. Reserves exclude gold.






































































































American Samoa 2 0 0 2 NA NA NA
Cambodia 0 0 2 2 0 272 12
China 1 0 0 1 0 620 11
Fiji 0 0 0 0 4 1934 17
Indonesia 1 2 0 3 1 674 9
Kiribati 0 0 0 0 6 467 NA
Korea 3 0 0 3 1 7806 10
Lao PDR 0 0 2 3 0 278 6
Malaysia 0 0 0 0 1 3015 28
Marshall Islands 0 0 0 0 3 2351 NA
Micronesia, Fed. Sts. 0 0 0 0 0 1996 41
Mongolia 1 0 3 4 4 405 16
Myanmar 0 0 0 0 NA NA NA
Northern Mariana Islands 0 0 0 0 NA NA NA
Palau 0 0 0 0 0 6091 NA
Papua New Guinea 4 0 0 4 4 609 12
Philippines 4 2 0 6 2 944 9
Samoa 2 0 0 2 3 1202 28
Solomon Islands 1 0 0 1 4 763 16
Thailand 2 0 0 2 1 1596 17
Timor-Leste 0 0 0 0 2 385 NA
Tonga 0 0 0 0 0 1361 25
Vanuatu 0 0 0 0 4 1217 18
Vietnam 1 0 2 3 0 318 11
All 22 4 9 36 40 1521 17














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































24Table 7: The 1997 Asian Crisis Eect (All Countries in Sample, Total IMF
Programs)
LSDV GMM
Reserves, last period { { 0.58*** (0.03)
Population {0.51** (0.23) {0.23 (0.28)
GDP per cap. 0.52*** (0.14) {0.13 (0.13)
Int. Rate {0.00 (0.00) 0.00** (0.00)
Imports to GDP 1.10*** (0.10) 0.61*** (0.10)
Crisis {0.02 (0.07) {0.04 (0.04)
IMF 0.07*** (0.02) 0.06*** (0.01)
Curr. Acc. to GDP 0.01*** (0.00) 0.01*** (0.00)
Regime 0.05 (0.04) {0.04 (0.05)
M2 to GDP 0.23** (0.09) 0.13* (0.07)
Short Debt to GNI {0.01 (0.04) 0.02 (0.02)
Fin. Openness 0.09*** (0.02) 0.01 (0.02)
Post 1997 0.16** (0.07) 0.08* (0.05)
Const. {3.39 (3.43) { {
Table notes: For variable information see Table 3 and text.
25